Sandinistas who now occupy the old dictator's bunker, he fought on the ground rather than from a safe san Approved F


In the letter to President Reagan, Mr. Pastora thanks the president for his past support and outlines his movement's objectives:

· "Withdrawal of Cuban, Soviet and other communist forces from Nicaragua"

"Reduction of Nicaragua's communist armed forces, which oppress the Nicaraguan people and threaten Nicaragua's neighbors".

"An end to the export of subversion from Nicaragua, which would be the logical consequence of achieving the first two objectives.

In the bluntest possible language. Mr. Pastora also warns the president



those of a diplomat or even a professional manager of violence engaged in low-intensity conflict. He is, after all, engaged in a life-and-death struggle that for him has only win-ners and losers. He also has the advantage of knowing his former colleagues far better than anyone else does - in or out of the American government.

'The communist objective is to destroy us, and negotiations are one

see PASTORA, page 6A

# Eden Pastora, Nicaragua's

## **Embassy in Moscow** 'riddled with KGB'

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow "is riddled with KGB operatives" who are operating under the cover of support and maintenance workers, according to White House and congressional sources.


These sources told The Washington Times that there are between 100 and 130 Soviets working at the U.S. Embassy at any given time. They handle routine maintenance, electrical and plumbing repairs, do the building cleaning and, until recently, answered the telephones.

Soviet personnel also are used as auto mechanics and drivers for U.S.

diplomats. They run the foodservice operations and man the kiosk in the embassy where liquor is

U.S counterintelligence officials say that these Soviets, who are assigned their tasks by the Kremlin, also take orders from and report to the KGB on goings-on at the embassy.

CBS News reported Mond



CBS quoted one intelligence officer as saying the potential for compromising sensitive information should be viewed with "considerable seriousness."

U.S. officials have been warning for several years of the security risks associated with employing Soviet nationals in the embassy.

But, they report, the State Department has not felt sufficiently concerned to warrant changing the

"It's an outrage," one senior

see KGB, page 8A

## Technology protection stirs inter-agency wa

By Ted Agres
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

As the Soviet Union attempts to steal high-technology from the United States, the government protectors of America's most precious technological secret

The opposi mally staid Co pitted against and its ally, toms Service.

Each depai other with he

massive leaks of highly information to the Soviets.

And each department is for turf in the high-tech review and enforcement pr For starters, here are so

verbal colves: Commerce Depe cently to have de ewspaper writers. w/#8406 laab, U.S. Cus

3 United Sta. nake that asset ast a candidate f ear Award. They er there sin Cus

## Closing of Pennsylvania Avenue to guard White House suggested

#### INDEX

Wednesday, March 27, 1985 Volume 4, Number 62 5 Sections, 48 pages

FOOD with no portion of the most famous House security a Secret Service Approved Ror Release; 2001/03/04/25:06-14-RDP96-00788R001990659001-5

### Mengele new ene

By John Holmes
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Madrid

59/31pc

44/40sh Vienna

Warsaw

58/32c

#### Air Quality Index: Good (35)

re and conviction of Mengele. ennedy has written to the Senappropriations Committee to at the measure be included in a spokesman said yesterday.

Kennedy's sentiments were d by Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, , who called The Times' gesan excellent idea.'

ything to further the cause, to r the search for and seizure of ele is all for the better," said )'Amato, one of the senators active in seeking Nazi war

rney General Edwin Meese ed the reward as "a further de of concern the people have country, which is reflected in tion. We have several of our es cooperating with other ies to locate and apprehend le."

Justice Department joined urch for Mengele last month : former U.S. Army counterence officer said he believed nerican intelligence services rrested, questioned and d Mengele in Austria in 1947. c Attorney General William Smith initiated the investigathich Mr. Meese, who suchim, has continued.

pokesman for the West an Embassy said it had ed no official word from Bonn matter yesterday. He noted, er, that "since our legal ities have put out the reward, n see we have every interest lengele can be found and

appreciate the offer of this i. It is a warm, resonant affirof decency," said Mr. Perlof the Anti-Defamation : "Over the decades, the conwith the apprehension of kable beasts like Mengele en lonely and anguished. To paper of the stature of The gton Times do this is reassur-

n Hier said some of the inforthe Wiesenthal Center has d since posting its reward to be valuable," but he urged vspaper to exercise care and e in sifting through any inforit receives.

missiles nor explained how ay for them at a time of \$200 ederal deficits.

time has come to stop showa other how tough we are," tht said. "The time has come on together and make an ent of peace for all man-

November December

From page 1A

administration official said.

"When a Russian dissident, or people wanting to give us information, called the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, his call would be answered by a KGB switchboard operator.

The situation has prompted several high-level investigations, the sources said. A counterintelligence specialist was dispatched to Moscow earlier this year to study the embassy staffing situation firsthand. His report was said to include the following:

 Soviet nationals operate the embassy carpool and also are the auto mechanics. In this capacity they have access to the diplomatic fleet. Officials suspect that bugs may have been planted in the various vehicles. Even if they haven't, having a Soviet driver should make confidential conversation impossible.

 The kiosk in the embassy, which sells liquor as well as sundries, is staffed by Soviet nationals. These people can observe who in the embassy may have a drinking problem — important information to KGB recruitment or blackmail efforts.

• The person operating the embassy canteen is said to be a Chilean by birth married to a Soviet citizen. "Pablo," as he is called, is friendly with many American diplomats. But, as one source said, "What is he doing at the embassy in Moscow if he is not a Chilean communist?

"Pablo, along with Soviets working in the kitchen, can observe who is having lunch with whom, who is flirting with whom, and so on," the source said. Again, this is said to be useful information to the KGB.

 The embassy telephone operators are Soviets. This gives them firsthand knowledge of who is calling in and the potential to monitor conversations. One source said this situation, at least, may have changed since the counterintelligence officer's report.

Having Soviet nationals roaming the U.S. Embassy has long worried some Reagan administration officials The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) launched its own investigation of the embassy staffing situation in 1983.

According to a source familiar with the PFIAB probe, State Department and other officials were asked to explain the rationale for employing Soviets rather than American citizens.

Secretary of State George Shultz reportedly told PFIAB that he was not personally aware of the embassy situation. The panel also asked Richard Combs, who was deputy director of the State Department's Soviet Desk, for an explanation.

Mr. Combs reportedly replied that it was standard practice to employ Soviet nationals for menial and support work at the embassy. The reason, he reportedly said, hinged on both budgetary and policy reasons.

If Americans were hired to do the work it would cost the taxpayer far more, Mr. Combs reportedly, said. Furthermore, these lower-level workers would be subject to recruitment by the KGB and would represent a security risk. According to this source, it was felt safer to have "known" KGB operatives around the embassy than unknown operatives.

"Their thinking was that at least you knew who the KGB was with the Soviets there," the source said, "But if the KGB recruited an American, you wouldn't necessarily know about it."

This logic apparently irritated several PFIAB members, who challenged Mr. Combs. "By this reasoning, you would say it would be best if all our embassy positions were staffed by the KGB," one member

Mr. Combs, who is now director of the State Department's Office of East European Affairs, declined yesterday to comment on the situation.

"I did speak to PFIAB two or three years ago," Mr. Combs said, "but what you are asking about is all very classified information. We just can't comment on it. It's highly sensitive."

PFIAB is a presidentiallyappointed civilian panel whose purpose is to advise the president on intelligence matters.

- Ted Agres

## Peter Steiner

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001900650007-5

is argued that instead of te MX as a bargaining chip in

Approved For Release 2001/03/07: CIA-RDP96-00788R001900650007-5

## **Embassy Typewriter Bugging Blamed on Routine Shipment**

By David Hoffman

Typewriters bugged by the Soviets in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had been shipped through "normal channels" instead of receiving special diplomatic handling, allowing electronic devices to be placed in them, intelligence sources said yesterday.

They speculated that the bugs were "passive" devices that reflected signals to low level transmitters hidden in embassy walls, presumably allowing the Soviets to monitor what was written on the typewriters.

Administration officials confirmed this week that the Soviets had penetrated security at the embassy for at least a year, and perhaps longer, by "lifting things off typewriters." They said the bugging was ended after being discovered last year.

One source, who asked not to be

identified, said yesterday that the Soviets probably did not gather much valuable U.S. intelligence by bugging the typewriters because little of the most highly sensitive material would be kept in the Moscow embassy.

In addition, this source said, material kept there is handled carefully in special areas that have been "swept" for listening devices, making it impossible for the typewriter trues to work.

"I don't regard it as terribly serious," the source said of the bugging, suggesting that the security breach is not as threatening to the United States as other intelligence losses to the Soviets in recent years.

An administration official said, "The trouble is that you never know exactly what they did get" with the devices in typewriters. The incident "was taken seriously" by U.S. officials, he said.